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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN HENLINE, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
vs. ) Case No. 14264 
SAM SMITH, Warden, : 
Utah State Prison, 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Shawn Henline, appeals from a decision 
of the Third Judicial District Court denying his release from 
the Utah State Prison upon the petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Shawn Henline filed an amended complaint and petition 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his commitment 
to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The matter came on for 
hearing on September 4, 19 75, before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Sr., who denied the petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant, Shawn Henline, seeks reversal of the 
court below with the direction that he be released from the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
custody of the respondent upon a writ of habeas corpus or, 
in the alternative, this matter be remanded with directions 
to the District Court that the Appellant be resentenced 
after a proper determination of the degree of the offense to 
which the Appellant entered a guilty plea. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 9, 19 74, the Appellant entered a plea to 
the offense of theft as defined by Section 76-6-412, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended) before Marcellus K. Snow, 
judge of the Third Judicial District Court in Case Number 
25559, On May 2, 19 74, judgment was rendered from the 
Third District Court in Salt Lake County and sentence was 
issued thereunder on the 3rd day of May, 19 74, committing 
the Appellant to the Utah State Prison "for the indeterminate 
term as provided by law for the crime of attempted theft 
(third degree)". On June 13, 1975, the Appellant filed a 
complaint and petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in 
the District Court on the basis that the restraint of the 
Appellant was unlawful on the following bases: 
a) No determination was ever made by the Court as 
to the value of the property taken by the Appellant pursuant 
to the requirements of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). 
b) The Court below erred in finding that Appellant 
entered his guilty plea voluntarily and the Court abused its 
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discretion in failing to allow the petitioner to withdraw 
his plea of guilty prior to sentencing. 
The transcript of the arraignment on January 9, 19 74, 
which was filed as a supplemental record on January 14, 
1976, will be referred to as "T.A.". The transcript of 
the sentencing on May 2, 19 74, will be referred to as "T.S." 
and the Sentence will be referred to as "S.". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE 
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN AND THE 
DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE PURSUANT TO THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 76-6-412, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED ( 1953 AS AMENDED). 
Appellant contends the failure of the Court to make 
a determination as to the value of the property taken on entry 
of a plea of guilty to the offense of attempted theft renders 
Appellant's plea and subsequent sentence invalid. No deter-
mination was ever made by the Court as to the value of the 
property allegedly taken by the Appellant contrary to the 
requirements of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (19 53 
as amended). 
It is clear from the transcript of January 9, 19 74, 
that your Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense 
of attempted theft. On page 5 of the transcript of January 
9, 1974, at line 8 (Supplemental Record), a discussion ensued 
between the Court and the County Attorney and the Appellant 
-3-
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regarding the charge to which the Appellant is entering a 
plea: 
Therefore, what, then, is your plea 
*'-.'•'" to the lesser, included offense of 
theft of property from a person (Court) 
MR. HYDE: Attempted theft of property. 
THE COURT: Excuse me, attempted theft. 
MR. HYDE: He asked you. 
THE COURT: What is your plea? 
MR. HENLINE: Guilty. 
THE COURT: A plea of guilty may be entered. 
The Court at no time in the proceedings inquired into or 
determined the value of the property and was therefore unable 
to determine the classification of the offense of theft 
pursuant to the terms of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). The Court, further, failed to determine 
the degree of offense pursuant to Section 77-24-9, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended): 
Where an information or indictment 
charged an offense which is divided 
into degrees without specifying de-
grees, if the defendant pleads guilty, 
generally the Court shall, before 
accepting a plea, examine witnesses 
to determine the degree of the offense 
f
 of which the defendant is guilty. 
Even though there is a discussion within the transcript 
of January 9, 1974, regarding the entry of the Appellant's 
plea, it is abundantly clear that the crime to which the 
petitioner actually entered a plea of guilty was not "attempted 
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theft of property from a person" but was instead, attempted 
theft (T.A. , page 5, line 8 and T.S.). Attempted theft of 
property may be classified as anything from a Class B mis-
demeanor to a third-degree felony depending solely upon the 
value of the property taken. The Court failed to determine 
that value and therefore your Appellant is currently incar-
cerated in the Utah State Prison pursuant to an improper 
sehtence. This matter should be remanded back to the District 
Court for imposition of a correct sentence after a proper 
determination is made of the value of the property and the 
degree of offense involved. Belt v. Turner, 25 U.2d 230, 
479 P.2d 791 (1971). 
POINT II 
THE GUILTY PLEA ENTERED BY THE APPELLANT 
ON JANUARY 9, 1974, WAS COERCED; AND WAS 
INVOLUNTARILY ENTERED BASED UPON FALSE 
AND MISLEADING INFORMATION BEING GIVEN 
TO THE APPELLANT. THE COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT 
TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
During the arraignment and all prior proceedings up 
and until the entry of the plea by the Appellant on January 
9, 19 74, the Appellant steadfastly had asserted his innocence 
to all the charges pending before the court (T.A., T.S.). 
Prior to the arraignment on January 9, 19 74, the petitioner 
was approached by Mr. Lynn Brown who had been appointed to 
represent him with the proposal that if he entered a plea of 
guilty to attempted theft on Criminal Case Number 25559, the 
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County Attorney's Office would reduce the charges pending to 
attempted theft and dismiss another charge pending in a 
different action* Defense counsel did then tell the Appel-
lant how to answer certain questions which would be put to 
him before the judge on January 9, 19 74, and on advice of 
counsel, Appellant submitted the appropriate answers even 
though he did not understand the nature of the proceedings and, 
in fact, the answers were incorrect due to defense counsel's 
representations. 
The record amply demonstrates that the Appellant not 
only misunderstood the nature of the proceedings of January 
9, 19 74, but was coerced by undue influence to enter the 
guilty plea against his will. At the January 9th hearing, 
upon questioning from his attorney, the Appellant's response 
as to whether or not he wishes to withdraw his guilty plea 
was: "Yes, I will take it to trial". (T.A., page 7, line 8). 
The Court then interjected its opinion upon the Appellant 
regarding the purported plea bargaining arrangement, stating: 
"There is no difference. The case is going to be dismissed". 
(T.A., page 7, line 10). The Appellant was confused and 
the entry of the guilty plea by him was contrary to the 
truth and contrary to his actual wishes. He was, in fact, 
being induced to enter a plea in this action because of 
exterior pressures from the County Attorney, his attorney, 
and the Court. It is illustrative of the confusion which 
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was caused by the actions of the Court and the respective 
attorneys at the Appellant's arraignment when, in fact, counsel 
for the Appellant stated to him: "It will be dismissed on 
the sentencing on the other deal". (T.A., page 7, line 20), 
It is blatantly obvious that Mr. Henline did not understand 
both the nature of the act which he was being urged to do 
nor the explanations which were being given to him. The 
"it" and the "other deal" both referred to another pending 
charge, number 2 6201, yet Mr. Henlinefs counsel told him he 
would be sentenced under that pending charge but at the same 
time that charge would be dismissed. 
It is well established that the entry of a plea of 
guilty is substantially more than an admission of doing 
specified conduct. It constitutes, in fact, a conviction to 
the crime for which the plea was entered and ignorance or 
incomprehension on the part of the defendant acts to deprive 
the defendant of constitutionally protected rights. Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Mr. Henline was instructed 
not to respond correctly to questions put to him by his 
attorney pursuant to the requirements of Boykin, supra. 
In the transcript of January 9, 19 74, pages 2-5, Mr. Brown 
asks the Appellant questions relative to his plea. The 
script clearly reveals Mr. Henline was instructed to incor-
rectly answer certain questions put to him. 
MR. BROWN: Has anyone made any promises 
to you as to what the sentence would be 
if you pled guilty to this charge? 
-7-
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MR. HENLINE: No. 
MR. BROWN: Has anyone made any threats 
or in any way made promises to induce 
you to plead guilty to this charge? 
MR. HENLINE: No. (T.A., page 4). 
* It is conceded throughout the record in this matter 
that, in fact, a plea bargaining arrangement had been arrived 
at which did induce Mr. Henline to enter his plea. However, 
after the entry of the plea, Mr. Henline then discovered 
the plea was to "attempted theft" as stated by Mr. Hyde and 
the Court (T.A., page 5, line 8) but the sentencing was for 
the offense of "attempted theft of property from a person", 
a third degree felony. It is indicative of the coercive 
circumstances surrounding the entry of the Appellant's plea 
that while he is entering a plea to one degree of an offense, 
he is being sentenced on a more severe degree of that offense. 
The mere fact that a defendant, against whom there 
are multiple charges pending, pleads guilty to one of them 
on a condition that the other be dropped does not, in and of 
itself, compel a finding of coercion. This Court in Strong 
v. Turner, 22 U.2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969) , stated that the 
record must justify a conclusion that a defendant's decision 
to enter a guilty plea was not arrived at rationally. Such 
is the case in this action. There is ample evidence in the 
record that the Appellant did not understand or rationally 
weigh the choices because of misleading and confusing informa-
tion which was being given to him by those vested with the 
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responsibility of protecting his interests as well as the 
interests of society. 
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas, 
according to the Court in Brady v. Un ited States, 397 U.S. 
742 (1970), at page 755, is essentially that defined by Judge 
Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in She!ton v. 
United States, 246 F.2d 571 (1957), at page 115: 
A plea of guilty as entered by one fully 
aware of the direct consequences, including 
natural value of any commitments made to 
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by 
threats (or promise to discontinue im-
proper harassment), misrepresentation . . . 
Appellant contends he was not aware of the direct 
consequences of his guilty plea in that he was instructed 
to answer questions presented to him before the court in-
correctly; he was misled as to the degree of the offense 
to which he was entering the plea; he was told that the 
other charge which was supposed to be dismissed was the 
charge on which he would be sentenced; and he was misled as 
to when the other charge would be dismissed contrary to his 
agreement and understanding with the County Attorney (T.A., 
page 6, line 20 to page 7, line 20). It is submitted that 
the composite of these irregularities in the proceedings 
at the time Mr. Henline entered a plea of guilty was severe 
and had an effect of confusing the defendant and coercing 
him, whether intentionally or unintentionally, into entering 
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a plea against his will. 
Pursuant to the terms of Section 77-24-3, Utah Code 
Annotated (19 53 as amended), the Court is vested with the 
discretion to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty. 
In
 State v. Plum, 14 U.2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963), this Court 
prescribed that withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. As this 
Court stated in Plum, supra, one cannot attempt to withdraw 
his plea merely because he disagrees with the sentence imposed 
by the court. But in this action, Mr. Henline moved to with-
draw his plea of guilty prior to the time of sentencing (T.S., 
pages 2,3). This was not a case of remorse because of the 
severity of the sentence but, rather, an attempt by the 
Appellant to rectify a plea entered under coercive circum-
stances which he did not understand. At this point in time, 
there can be no prejudice to the State and the totality of the 
circumstances set forth in the record of the Appellant's 
arraignment on January 9, 19 74, and his sentencing on May 2, 
19 74, clearly reflect a concerted effort by the Court, the 
County Attorney, and the attorney for the Appellant to over-
ride the will of the Appellant and induce him to enter a plea 
of guilty. The sum total effect of the misleading and con-
fusing information given to the defendant by all the parties 
involved and the total lack of any prejudice to the State, 
and the Appellant's attempt to rectify his misunderstanding 
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by requesting the Court to allow him to withdraw his plea of 
guilty, present sufficient facts to support Appellant's 
claim that, unlike the issues before this court in State v. 
Plumf 14 U.2d 124, 328 P.2d 671 (1963), the trial court 
erred and abused its discretion in not allowing the Appellant 
to withdraw his plea of guilty and proceed to trial. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the cases and statutes cited and the 
circumstances in this action, it is concluded that the Ap-
pellant should have been granted a writ of habeas corpus or, 
in the alternative, that the Appellant should have been re-
sentenced after a proper determination of the degree of the 
offense to which he entered his plea was arrived at by the 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/"') // £ ^^/T=4^—- -
W^c/ <&£fa-1 
ROBERT FELTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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